Research
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Simon Loertscher
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| Fields of Interest
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Industrial Organization
Mechanism Design
Political Economics
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Refereed Publications
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- Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers, Journal of Economics & Managment Strategy, Volume 16, Number 4, Winter 2007: 793-825
- Market Making Oligopoly, Journal of Industrial Economics , Volume L VI, Number 2, 2008: 263-289
- Global and Local Players in a Model of Spatial Competition (with G. Muehlheusser), Economics Letters, Volume 98, Number 1, 2008: 100-106
- Learning, public good provision, and the information trap (with A. Berentsen and E. Bruegger), Journal of Public Economics, Volume 92, Issues 5-6, June 2008: 998-1010
- On Cheating, Doping and Whistleblowing (with A. Berentsen and E. Bruegger), European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 24, 2008: 415-436
- Vertical mergers that eliminate double markups are procompetitive, Economic Bulletin, Volume 4, Number 22, 2008: 1-6
- The ABC of complementary products mergers (with S. Anderson and Y. Schneider), Economics Letters, Volume 106: 212-215
- Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 94, 2010: 761-767 (with R. Hodler and D. Rohner)
- Chain Stores, Consumer Mobility, and Market Structure (with Y. Schneider), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Volume 167(2), 2011: 236-246
- Sequential Location Games, webappendix (with G. Muehlheusser), RAND Journal of Economics (forthcoming)
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Other Publications
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| Working Papers
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- Dynamic House Allocations (with A. Abdulkadiroglu)
- The Evolution of Cheating in Asymmetric Contests (with A. Berentsen and E. Bruegger)
- Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions (with R. Hodler and D. Rohner) A previous version circulated under the title 'False Alarm? Terror Alerts and Reelection'.
- Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses This supercedes our previous paper titled 'When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries?' (with A. Niedermayer)
- Information Transmission by Imperfectly Informed Parties
- Intermediation, Search, and Transfer Augmented Double Auctions (with A. Niedermayer)
- Risk, Search, and Competing Exchanges
- Matching with Frictions, and the Law of Demand
- Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically: The Case of Percentage Fees, (with A. Niedermayer)
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